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JUSTICE GINSBURG'S DISSENT IN
BUSH V. GORE
HUGH BAXTER*
Abstract: In this essay, I examine Justice Ginsburg's dissenting opinion in
Bush v. Gore, the decision that ended the 2000 controversy over the winner
of the presidency. I look critically at Justice Ginsburg's invocation of
federalism-based deference to the Florida courts' interpretations of state
election law in the recount controversy. I consider also Justice Ginsburg's
criticisms of the Court's remedial decision to stop the recounts. Finally, I
take up the much-debated question of how to understand Justice Ginsburg's
final two words: "I dissent," rather than "I respectfully dissent." My
conclusion is that the omission of "respectfully" is pointed, but not for the
simple reasons usually given. More significant, I think, is her decision not to
point to possible future positive consequences of a decision from which she
dissents-a strategy she often has followed in other cases, even ones in
which her disagreement with the Court is deep.
When the editors of this Review asked me, along with other former
clerks to Justice Ginsburg, to write an essay on some aspect of Justice
Ginsburg's jurisprudence, I chose to focus on a single case: Bush v. Gore. I
justified this narrow focus by recalling the Court's caution that the
precedential force of that case might not extend beyond the case's "present
circumstances."' If that is so, I thought, then consideration of Bush v. Gore
is in fact consideration of an entire and complete body of law.
I pick up the story of Bush v. Gore with Bush's second and final trip
to the United States Supreme Court . Bush presented three claims. First, he
argued, the Florida Supreme Court's recount decisions violated Article II,
section 1, clause 2 of the United States Constitution. That clause provides
• Professor of Law and of Philosophy, Boston University.
1. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000) (per curiam).
2. The opinion for the previous trip, under the title Bush v. Palm Beach County
Canvassing Bd, appears at 531 U.S. 70 (2000).
3. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *9, Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd.,
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that "[e]ach State shall appoint [presidential electors], in such Manner as
the Legislature thereof may direct."4 According to Bush, the Florida
Court's decisions violated this clause by departing from the statutory
scheme in place at the time of the election.
Second, Bush argued that the Florida Court had erred in mandating a
recount that could not be completed by December 12. s This date was
significant, according to Bush, because it was designated by 3 U.S.C. § 5 as
the last day for submitting a slate of electors that would be conclusively
binding.6 The Florida Court's ruling would take the state outside this "safe
harbor" provision, Bush contended, because it had departed from the
statutory scheme in place on election day. In this latter respect, Bush's
second claim sounded the same theme as the first: the Florida Court had
rewritten the Florida Election Code, not permissibly interpreted it.
Third, Bush maintained, the recount procedures were "selective and
capricious," violating both equal protection and due process guarantees.7
The inclusion of this claim was perhaps surprising: the Court had refused to
hear it the first time the case had come before the Court.8
And yet this third claim was the basis upon which the Court granted
Bush relief-and victory in the presidential race. In a per curiam opinion
joined by the five members of the Court generally deemed most
conservative-Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices O'Connor, Scalia,
Kennedy, and Thomas-the Court found three defects in the Florida
531 U.S. 40 (2001) (No. 00-836), 2001 WL 34117432.
4. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
5. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 3, at *9.
6. That section reads as follows:
If any State shall have provided, by laws enacted prior to the day fixed
for the appointment of the electors, for its final determination of any
controversy or contest concerning the appointment of all or any of the
electors of such State, by judicial or other methods or procedures, and
such determination shall have been made at least six days before the
time fixed for the meeting of the electors, such determination made
pursuant to such law so existing on said day, and made at least six days
prior to said time of meeting of the electors, shall be conclusive, and
shall govern in the counting of the electoral votes as provided in the
Constitution, and as hereinafter regulated, so far as the ascertainment of
the electors appointed by such State is concerned.
3 U.S.C. § 5 (2006).
7. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 3, at *9.
8. Compare id. at * 1 (setting out three questions for review, the third of which is the
equal protection/due process claim mentioned in text), with Bush v. Palm Beach County
Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 1004, 1004 (2000) (granting certiorari).
[Vol. 43:711
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Court's recount decisions, each violative of equal protection. 9 Correcting
these defects would be impossible by the "safe harbor" date of December
12-the date on which the Court issued its opinion. And so, the Court
concluded, the recounts must cease. Justices Souter and Breyer, while
agreeing that the recount procedures as they stood were inconsistent with
equal protection, would have remanded to the Florida Court for it to decide
how much weight the "safe harbor" date should receive. They noted that
this question was one of state rather than federal law. Accordingly, they
presented their views in dissents from the Court's judgment.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, wrote
separately to say that he also would have found for Bush on his first claim:
the contention that the Florida Court's recount decisions had
"impermissibly distorted" the relevant provisions of the Florida Election
Code "beyond what a fair reading required, in violation of Article II.'' 1°
The four dissenters were the Justices usually deemed most liberal:
Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Each dissenter wrote an
opinion. Justice Ginsburg first focused her attack on the separate
concurrence, then turned to the per curiam's equal protection ruling and
remedial decision.
In rejecting the concurrence's approach, Justice Ginsburg reminded
the three Justices of a principle ordinarily agreed upon: the principle of
deference to state courts' interpretation of state law. She noted that this
principle applies even when, as in the habeas corpus context, the existence
of a federal right depends upon a court's answer to a question of state
law.11 The per curiam offers up only three examples, Justice Ginsburg
observed, of cases in which the Court has "rejected outright an
interpretation of state law by a state high court," and each was "embedded
in historical contexts hardly comparable to the situation here." 12 The first
was decided in 1813, "amidst vociferous States' rights attacks on the
Marshall Court."' 3 The other two, Justice Ginsburg noted, were part and
9. The three alleged problems are accurately stated in Justice Breyer's dissenting
opinion: "[F]irst, the failure to include overvotes in the manual recount; second, the fact that
all ballots, rather than simply the undervotes, were recounted in some, but not all, counties;
and third, the absence of a uniform, specific standard to guide the recounts." Bush v. Gore,
531 U.S. 98, 145 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting). "Overvote" refers to ballots for which the
machine registered more than one choice for President; "undervote" refers to ballots for the
machine registered no such choice.
10. Id. at 115 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
11. Id. at 136-37 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
12. See id. at 139-40.
13. Id. at 140.
2009]
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parcel of "Southern resistance to the civil rights movement."' 14 In each,
Justice Ginsburg suggested, the state court had distorted pre-existing state
law to justify denying a federally secured right. 15 But in the present case,
by contrast, the Florida Court's interpretation of state election law was
designed to protect exercise of a federal right: it aims at "counting every
legal vote."' 16 Accordingly, Justice Ginsburg concluded, that court "surely
should not be bracketed with state high courts of the Jim Crow South."1
7
As Justice Ginsburg likely would admit, these arguments against the
Rehnquist concurrence only go so far. The concurrence distinguished the
selection of presidential electors from other contexts, and did so for reasons
rooted in constitutional text. The Chief Justice contended that the Federal
Constitution secures a right to vote in presidential elections only if a state's
legislature has chosen popular election as the method of elector selection,
and even then, only upon the terms mandated by the state legislature. And
thus, while the Court's review of state court interpretation must be
"deferential," the Chief Justice acknowledged, it must at the same time be
"independent," examining whether the state court has remained faithful to
the legislatively mandated scheme.' 8 In this unusual context, in which the
Constitution "confers a power on a particular branch of a State's
government," the balance of power between state legislature and state court
takes on federal constitutional significance.' 9 That, at any rate, is the
concurrence's contention.
Thus, while Justice Ginsburg's theme of deference is important, the
argument against the concurrence must acknowledge and address the
Article II context. And Justice Ginsburg does, though, by denying that
context's special significance. In the Chief Justice's "independent" reading
of Florida election law, Justice Ginsburg argues, the concurrence "reach[es]
out" "to disrupt a State's republican regime. 20 In so doing, Justice
Ginsburg maintains, the concurrence "contradicts the basic principle that a
State may organize itself as it sees fit."'', According to Justice Ginsburg,
"Article II does not call for the scrutiny" that the concurring Justices would
apply to the Florida court's opinion.
14. Id.
15. See Bush, 531 U.S. at 139-40.
16. Id. at 141.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 114 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
19. Id. at 112-13.
20. Id. at 141 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
21. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 141 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 142. Justice Ginsburg's opinion actually reads: "Article I1 does not call for the
scrutiny undertaken by this Court." Id. This wording suggests that perhaps the Rehnquist
[Vol. 43:711
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I find myself not entirely persuaded by this argument that Article II
has no effect on the basic principle of deference to state court interpretation
of state law. However, Justice Ginsburg hints at further support for her
conclusion when she tweaks the Chief Justice for his "solicitude for the
Florida Legislature... at the expense of the more fundamental solicitude
we owe to the legislature's sovereign. '' 3 Here, it seems, Justice Ginsburg is
suggesting that Bush and the Chief Justice erred in reading Article II to
require a special method of statutory interpretation. Toward this end,
Justice Ginsburg quotes the relevant clause of Article II, supplying her own
emphasis to diminish the concurrence's focus on the legislature: "'Each
State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct,'
the electors for President and Vice-President.,
24
On this reading, the important point is that it is the state that does the
appointing; the fact that it is for the legislature to direct this appointment
simply reflects the ordinary fact that states express law in the first instance
through their legislatures. But legislative expressions of law must be
interpreted, the argument would go, and that task is for the courts. So
understood, I think Justice Ginsburg is implying there is nothing special
about the Article II context that requires less than ordinarily deferential
review of a state court's statutory interpretation.
The concurrence offers no response to this argument. But an
apparently plausible counter is suggested by Michael McConnell.
According to McConnell, Article II's reference to "the Legislature" is not
simply shorthand for "the State." Instead, McConnell contends, "Article
II... places authority to set electoral rules in the institution least able to
manipulate the rules to favor a particular candidate." 25 And thus, while
"Justice Ginsburg is correct that, in ordinary cases, federal courts must
defer to state courts with regard to interpretations of state law[,] '' 26 the
"wisdom" of Article II is to alert us to the danger of partisan
"interpretations" of pre-existing statutory law-judicial "interpretations"
that would change the law to pursue partisan objectives.27
opinion originally was an opinion for the Court, demoted to a concurrence when Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy decided instead to rely upon the equal protection rationale. This
possibility, however, would mean that Justice Ginsburg, in the extraordinary haste with
which the opinions were issued, failed to correct the reference to "the Court." I remain
uncertain why Justice Ginsburg refers to "the Court" and Article I1 rather than to the
concurrence's reading of Article II.
23. Id. at 142.
24. Id.
25. Michael W. McConnell, Two-and-a-Half Cheers for Bush v. Gore, 68 U. CHI. L.
REv. 657, 663 (2001).
26. Id.
27. See Richard A. Epstein, "In such Manner as the Legislature Thereof May Direct":
2009]
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One might object that McConnell's counter would permit post-
election tinkering with the electoral scheme, so long as it was done by
legislatures, not courts or the state executive. That objection seems
unanswered by Article II's text. The only safeguard against a legislature's
post-election alteration of the elector selection scheme would seem to be
both statutory and political-the possibility that Congress could deem the
state's choice of electors outside the "safe harbor" of 3 U.S.C. § 5.2 But
perhaps the drafters of Article II were in fact unconcerned with legislative
manipulation: they gave legislatures apparently plenary power to "direct
the Manner of' electors' appointment, 29 and that would seem to include the
power to change the scheme post-election. And so it might be, then, that
Article II requires reviewing courts to police closely post-election judicial
interpretations, ensuring that legislative handiwork is not undone.
I'm skeptical, in other words, that we can so easily dismiss the
concurrence's theory of special scrutiny in this Article II context. But still,
the Chief Justice concedes that review of the Florida Supreme Court's
recount decisions must be "deferential," if "independent." Perhaps what our
Article II clause calls for is something less than the near-total deference
given ordinary state-court interpretations, but significant deference
nonetheless.
Justice Ginsburg's opinion suggests this intermediate point of view.
She reads the Chief Justice's concurrence as "maintain[ing] that Florida's
Supreme Court has veered so far from the ordinary practice of judicial
review that what it did cannot properly be called judging. 30 Justice Souter
implies a similar standard: the question, he suggests, is whether the Florida
The Outcome in Bush v. Gore Defended, 68 U. CHI. L. REv. 613, 620 (2001) ("[T]he strong
federal interest in the selection of the President of the United States makes it appropriate for
federal courts to see that all state actors stay within the original constitutional scheme.").
28. See 3 U.S.C. § 5 (2006). That would be because the laws determining the choice of
electors would not be "laws enacted prior to the day fixed for the appointment of the
electors .... Id.
29. The Supreme Court raised, but did not answer, the question whether the legislature's
power is constrained by state constitutions. See Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing
Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 78 (2000) (remanding for clarification "as to the extent to which the
Florida Supreme Court saw the Florida Constitution as circumscribing the legislature's
authority under Art. II, § 1, cl. 2"). By the time the case came back, this time under the
heading Bush v. Gore, the question seems to have largely disappeared. But see Bush v.
Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 148 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[N]either the text of Article II itself
nor the only case the concurrence cites that interprets Article II, leads to the conclusion that
Article II grants unlimited power to the legislature, devoid of any state constitutional
limitations, to select the manner of appointing electors." (citation omitted)). Clearly, the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, for example, would bar a racially
discriminatory selection scheme.
30. Bush, 531 U.S. at 135-36 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 43:711
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court's decision was "so unreasonable as to transcend the accepted bounds
of statutory interpretation, to the point of being a nonjudicial act and
producing new law untethered to the legislative Act in question." 3I And
Justice Breyer's dissent expresses the same idea: the question, he says, is
whether the state court's interpretation is "so misguided as no longer to
qualify as judicial interpretation or as a usurpation of the authority of the
state legislature. 32 All these formulations could be read to concede that
some review, rather than total deference, is appropriate in the context of
Article II, section 1, clause 2.
The question then becomes whether the Florida Supreme Court's
recount decisions passed under this standard. In the division of labor that
the Bush v. Gore dissenters adopted, the task of defending the Florida
Court's performance under this lenient standard fell largely to Justice
Souter and Justice Breyer. Neither commits himself to the correctness of
the Florida court's opinion-nor need he-but each argues, against the
concurrence, that the Florida court's interpretation was not "so
"unreasonable as to [be] a constitutionally 'impermissible distort[ion]' of
Florida law."33 Details of these arguments are beyond the scope of this
short paper; their merits have been amply and ably debated elsewhere.34
The remainder of Justice Ginsburg's dissent concerns the propriety of
the Court's decision to "remedy" the recounts' equal-protection defects by
stopping the recounts altogether-rather than remanding for the Florida
court to decide what to do in the first instance. This aspect of the Court's
opinion has been almost universally criticized. The Court's reasoning was
that the Florida court had attributed to its state's legislature the objective of
meeting the December 12 "safe harbor" deadline, and the Supreme Court's
opinion was released on the evening of December 12. And so, maintained
the Court, the Florida legislative scheme would not permit renewing the
recount.
31. Id. at 131 (Souter, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 152 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 151 (alterations in original). For Justice Breyer's reading of Florida election
law, see id. at 149-52 (Breyer, J. dissenting); for Justice Souter's, see id. at 130-33 (Souter,
J., dissenting).
34. For a defense of the Florida court, see, for example, Jed Rubenfeld, Not as Bad as
Plessy. Worse, in BUSH v. GORE: THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY 20, 29-33 (2002); Jack M.
Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law and Politics, 110 YALE L.J. 1407,
1417-20 (2001); David A. Strauss, Bush v. Gore: What Were They Thinking?, 68 U. CHI. L.
REV. 737, 751-55 (2001). For criticism, see, for example, RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING
THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS 117-28 (2001);
Epstein, supra note 27, at 619-34; McConnell, supra note 25, at 664-72.
2009]
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In reaching this position, the Court went so far as to imply-
misleadingly-that the "safe harbor" preference was a requirement clearly
fixed in Florida statutory law. 35 Nowhere does that preference appear in
statutory text. It is true that the Florida court twice mentioned the
significance of the "safe harbor" for the Florida legislature. But the court
did not attribute overriding significance to the "safe harbor" deadline, nor
did it weigh the importance of the "safe harbor" preference against
conflicting statutory policies-such as counting all "legal votes."
36
Justice Ginsburg notes three other dates after December 12 that the
Florida court might have chosen for a recount deadline: the date the
electors meet (December 18), the date on which Congress must inquire of a
state that has not submitted its choice of electors (December 27), and the
date on which Congress ultimately would decide the matter (January 6).
As Justice Stevens observes: "in 1960, Hawaii appointed two slates of
electors and Congress chose to count the one appointed on January 4, 1961,
well after the Title 3 deadlines. 38
35. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000).
Because the Florida Supreme Court has said that the Florida Legislature
intended to obtain the safe-harbor benefits of 3 U.S.C. §5, Justice
Breyer's proposed remedy-remanding to the Florida Supreme Court
for its ordering of a constitutionally proper contest until December 18-
contemplates action in violation of the Florida Election Code, and hence
could not be part of an 'appropriate' order authorized by Fla. Stat. Ann.
§ 102.168(8) (Supp. 2001).
Id.
36. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 34, at 1421.
Ensuring that Florida's vote is "conclusive" is surely a valid purpose,
but it is not the only purpose behind the election code. Given changed
circumstances, one has to decide which purpose is more important-
meeting the safe harbor deadline or counting every legal vote and
attempting to discern which candidate actually received the most votes.
Choosing between valid but competing purposes is a fairly standard job
of courts in interpreting statutes. The text of the Florida Election Code
does not decide this question, and Rehnquist [one should add also the
Court in its per curiam opinion] simply disagreed about which was
more important. But that disagreement does not by itself constitute a
violation of Article II, Section 1.
Id. at 1423.
37. Bush, 531 U.S. at 143-44 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). As Justice Ginsburg notes, 3
U.S.C. § 15 contains "detailed provisions for determining, on 'the sixth day of January,' the
validity of electoral votes." Id. at 144.
38. Id. at 127 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 43:711
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Scholars have debated whether the Hawaii situation should count as
relevant precedent: Congress was well aware that the decision about
Hawaii's electoral votes would not change the outcome of the election, and
losing candidate Richard Nixon conceded those votes to his opponent. This
choice was at least in tension with federal law.39 But the December 18 date,
in particular, seems a clear possibility.
Further, as Justice Breyer explains in more detail, the Electoral Count
Act of 1887 contains not just the "safe harbor" provision of 3 U.S.C. § 5,
but a host of other provisions-provisions that make up a "detailed,
comprehensive scheme for counting electoral votes., 40 And this scheme,
Justice Breyer argues, commits the resolution of conflicts in some part to
state courts, 41 and in large part to Congress. 42 As Justice Breyer explains,
the Electoral Count Act-enacted after the disputed election of 1876, the
resolution of which involved Supreme Court Justice Bradley in an
unfortunate way43-is designed to leave no place for the federal courts.
"However awkward or difficult it may be for Congress to resolve difficult
electoral disputes," Justice Breyer writes, "Congress, being a political
body, expresses the people's will far more accurately than does an
unelected Court. And the people's will is what elections are about.
44
It is widely, though not universally, agreed that the Court's equal
protection theory did not legally support the Court's decision, on its own,
to terminate the recounts. The Florida court should have been given the
opportunity to decide for itself whether the "safe harbor" benefits
outweighed the importance of counting more accurately the "legal votes."
If the recounts were procedurally defective, and if December 12 was not a
drop-dead deadline, then it was for the Florida court to decide whether to
continue the recounts with constitutionally improved and adequate
procedures.
The concurrence's Article II theory, by contrast, would-if correct-
support the decision to terminate the recounts. This is so, at least, if the
concurrence was correct in rejecting, as an unreasonable interpretation of
the statutory term "legal vote," ballots that had been marked in violation of
the instructions (principally, the instruction to detach all comers of the
famous "chad"). If ballots with hanging chads were not "legal votes," the
argument goes, then the Florida court had no business ordering a manual
39. See McConnell, supra note 25, at 676 n.93.
40. Bush, 531 U.S. at 155 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
41. See id. at 153 (quoting 3 U.S.C. § 5 (2005)).
42. See id at 153-55 (detailing the Electoral Count Act's provisions and its history).
43. See id at 156-57.
44. Id. at 155.
2009)
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recount to count them.45 For that reason, defenders of the Supreme Court's
decision in Bush v. Gore have-to the extent that they offer a legal rather
than a purely pragmatic defense of the Court's decision-preferred the
concurrence's Article II strategy over the per curiam's equal protection
approach.46
The Article 1I argument, we have seen, is essentially the contention
that the Florida court departed from a proper judicial role. The full but
unexpressed form of this contention is that that court, whose justices all
were Democrats, abandoned law for politics in seeking the election of a
fellow Democrat. Justice Ginsburg is correct that none of her colleagues
formally "doubted the good faith and diligence with which Florida...
courts of law have performed their duties. ' 47 But even the per curiam
opinion, with its decision not to entrust the Florida court with the option to
perform a constitutionally adequate recount, could be read to rest upon
distrust of the Florida justices' good faith. In any event, the Court's
decision on remedy makes little sense as a matter of law.48
For her part, Justice Ginsburg refrains from casting aspersions upon
her colleagues' motivations-and so, it should be said also, do they refrain
from casting aspersions upon her and the other dissenters' motivations. The
"temperature" of Justice Ginsburg's dissent is decidedly warmer than most
of her other dissents, but cooler than intemperance. 49 I find it interesting
45. This argument depends also upon the circumstance that no one alleged that the
machines had failed to read ballots marked in accordance with the instructions.
46. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 34, at 151-53; Epstein, supra note 27, at 619-34;
McConnell, supra note 25, at 661-64, 671.
47. Bush, 531 U.S. at 144 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
48. The other interpretation, of course, is pragmatic: the Court wanted (wisely, say some
supporters of the Court's action) to spare the country the uncertainty and "constitutional
chaos" of a continued recount-with the overwhelming likelihood that, at the end of the
turbulence, Bush would emerge the winner even without Supreme Court assistance. See,
e.g., POSNER, supra note 34, at 133-34, 147-49.
49. Of the four dissenting opinions, Justice Stevens's is probably the most pointed. He
describes first what he takes to be Bush's motivation: "What must underlie petitioners'
entire federal assault on the Florida election procedures is an unstated lack of confidence in
the impartiality and capacity of the state judges who would make the critical decisions if the
vote count were to proceed. Otherwise, their position is wholly without merit." Bush, 531
U.S. at 128 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens continues:
The endorsement of that position by the majority of this Court can only
lend credence to the most cynical appraisal of the work of judges
through out the land.... Although we may never know with complete
certainty the identity of the winner of this year's Presidential election,
the identity of the loser is perfectly clear. It is the Nation's confidence in
the judge as an impartial guardian of the rule of law.
[Vol. 43:711
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that Justice Ginsburg refrained from comment upon the Court's apparent
limitation of Bush v. Gore's precedential force: "[o]ur consideration," the
Court wrote, "is limited to the present circumstances," whereupon the
Court proceeded to describe the facts of the case. 50 But then neither did she
note optimistically, as sometimes she does in dissent, that the Court's
otherwise regrettable decision might have some positive consequences.51
The possibility she might have mentioned was that the Court's newfound
solicitude for equal protection constraints on state election procedures
could be interpreted to produce more liberal-friendly results in the future-
such as the equalization of voting equipment, both with respect to its error
rate and with respect to equality of access among different (and politically
Id. at 128-29. Notice that Justice Stevens implies that the true "winner of this year's
Presidential election" is not necessarily George W. Bush, even though it was clear at the
time that the Court's decision had handed Bush the presidency: the true winner, Justice
Stevens says, "may never [be] know[n] with complete certainty." Id. at 128.
50. Id. at 109 (per curiam).
51. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 934-35 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Justice Ginsburg noted the points of agreement between her and the Court:
First, we agree that federalism and the slim judicial competence to draw
district lines weigh heavily against judicial intervention in
apportionment decisions; as a rule, the task should remain within the
domain of state legislatures. Second, for most of our Nation's history,
the franchise has not been enjoyed equally by black citizens and white
voters. To redress past wrongs and to avert any recurrence of exclusion
of blacks from political processes, federal courts now respond to Equal
Protection Clause and Voting Rights Act complaints of state action that
dilutes minority voting strength. Third, to meet statutory requirements,
state legislatures must sometimes consider race as a factor highly
relevant to the drawing of district lines. Finally, state legislatures may
recognize communities that have a particular racial or ethnic makeup,
even in the absence of any compulsion to do so, in order to account for
interests common to or shared by the persons grouped together.
Id. (citations omitted). Justice Ginsburg's strategy here was to limit what she saw as the
damage of the Court's opinion. She followed a similar approach in Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 271 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (requiring strict scrutiny of
federal affirmative action programs). She wrote in her dissent: "I write separately to
underscore not the differences the several opinions in this case display, but the considerable
field of agreement-the common understandings and concerns-revealed in opinions that
together speak for a majority of the Court." Id. at 271. She then put as positive a spin as
possible upon the Court's opinion-positive, that is, in the sense of suggesting agreement
with her own pro-affirmative action perspective. Id.
I learned as a law clerk to Justice Ginsburg, first at the D.C. Circuit and then at the Supreme
Court, that this approach was more productive-though less satisfying-than the impulse to
respond to the Court's majority with a verbal two-by-four.
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and racially identifiable) neighborhoods. Litigation toward this end has
developed since Bush v. Gore, and it remains uncertain whether the
Supreme Court will acknowledge the reform potential of that case.52
That brings me to the much debated last two words of Justice
Ginsburg's dissent: the words, set out in a separate sentence and paragraph,
"I dissent." Each of the other three dissents inserts the word "respectfully"
between "I" and "dissent." Controversy has arisen about just how pointed
Justice Ginsburg's omission of the word "respectfully" should be taken to
be. At first it was reported, incorrectly, that Justice Ginsburg otherwise
invariably inserts the word "respectfully." At the other end of the spectrum
on this matter, (then) New York Times Supreme Court reporter Linda
Greenhouse wrote that the omission of "respectfully" was a "choice...
that she frequently made for economy of style rather than to convey a
particular level of anger."53
In my estimation, while Greenhouse's estimation is closer, neither of
these characterizations quite captures the likely meaning of Justice
Ginsburg's choice. Greenhouse is right that Justice Ginsburg not
infrequently employs the words "I dissent" in succession. My LEXIS®
search for the words "I dissent" in Justice Ginsburg's dissents produced
twenty-three hits. Her usual format is to place these words either in the
same sentence with an explanation or (with other words in the same
sentence) immediately adjacent to an explanation. In this context, the
words have a softer impact than they do in Justice Ginsburg's Bush v. Gore
dissent, where they appear in their own sentence and even in their own
paragraph. 4 Only on one other occasion, my review suggests, has Justice
Ginsburg used the words "I dissent" as a full and independent sentence, 55
and the temperature of her opinion in that case does not seem to be
especially high. Her Bush v. Gore opinion, however, is unique in using the
words "I dissent" as an independent and full paragraph. Further
underscoring the significance of Justice Ginsburg's choice is the fact that
52. Election-law expert Richard Hasen's view is negative. See Richard L. Hasen, The
Untimely Death of Bush v. Gore, 60 STAN. L. REv. 1 (2007). But see Adam Liptak, Bush v.
Gore Set to Outlast Its Beneficiary, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2008, at Al.
53. Linda Greenhouse, Bush v. Gore: A Special Report.; Election Case a Test and a
Trauma for Justices, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 20, 2001, at Al.
54. The impact is variable, however, depending upon how pointedly she formulates the
reasons for her disagreement. For a comparatively sharp formulation, see Great- West Life &
Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 234 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). "Because
in my view Congress cannot plausibly be said to have 'carefully crafted' such confusion,
ante, at 221, 1 dissent." Id.
55. See Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 289 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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the other three dissenting opinions all employ the word "respectfully"-
though Justice Stevens, at least, seems to me less respectful in the body of
his opinion.
How significant, then, is Justice Ginsburg's decision to use "I dissent"
as a separate sentence and paragraph? Perhaps not terribly significant. She
did not make that choice in her dissents in Gonzales v. Carhart5 6 and
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. 57-even though in each case she
took the unusual step of reading her dissent from the bench,5 8 and even
though her dissent at least in Carhart is more pointed than her offering in
Bush v. Gore.
But perhaps one bit of evidence worth considering is this: Linda
Greenhouse reported that Justice Ginsburg and Justice Scalia had their
customary New Year's Eve dinner just nineteen days after Bush v. Gore.
59
Of course that doesn't mean that Justice Ginsburg wasn't angry with the
Court, and with Justice Scalia, for the outcome of Bush v. Gore. But it does
indicate the perspective that Justice Ginsburg takes upon professional
disappointments, even ones as bitter as Bush v. Gore must have been for
her.
56. 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1640-53 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Her concluding sentence
in that opinion is: "[flor the reasons stated, I dissent from the Court's disposition and would
affirm the judgments before us for review." Id. at 1653. She completes the opening to her
opinion with: "I dissent from the Court's disposition." Id. at 1641.
57. 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2188 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Her concluding sentence:
"For the reasons stated, I would hold that Ledbetter's claim is not time barred and would
reverse the Eleventh Circuit's judgment." Id. at 2188.
58. Likely she would have read her Bush v. Gore dissent from the bench as well, had the
opinion not been issued in the middle of the night rather than in open court.
59. See Greenhouse, supra note 53, at Al.
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